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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
OLAF THEODORE STEVENSEN, JR. 
and BARBARA ANN STEVENSEN, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
NICK N. NIKOLS, DAB ASSOCIATES, 
a partnership, GEORGE ANAG-
NOSTAKIS, GEORGE BRUCE BREIN-
HOLT and WELDEN L. DAINES, 
Defendants-Respondents. ] 
Case No. 14006 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Appellants leased the dining room and kitchen 
facilities of the Salt Lake Athletic Club and Spa (formerly 
the Towne House) to Respondent Nick N. Nikols (hereinafter 
Nikols), who subleased the premises to Respondents DAB 
Associates, Anagnostakis (Aggie), Breinholt and Daines 
(hereinafter DAB or Aggie). Because of certain defaults 
under the lease, Appellants brought an unlawful detainer 
action. Respondents counterclaimed for breach of the 
covenant of quiet possession. DAB also sought reimbursement 
for charges by members of Appellants1 club. 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The district court, the Honorable Peter F. Leary 
presiding, dismissed Appellant's Complaint and Respondents1 
Counterclaims, but awarded attorneys' fees to Respondents. 
The court also awarded DAB $613.01 for charges by Appel-
lants' members. '"•'^•--^  -•'•'-'? v-^^/^s- zo- t.:.^ .v--u, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the lower court's 
decision as to dismissal of their complaint, award of 
attorneys' fees to Respondents and award of $613.01 to DAB. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS a :: : 
The statement of facts has been divided into 
numbered paragraphs for more convenient reference. 
1. Appellants own and operate the Salt Lake 
Athletic Club. (R. 83). 
2. The Athletic Club had approximately 1500 
members, with approximately 250 family memberships and 
approximately 100 memberships issued to minors (R. 84), and 
the dining room facilities were available to them. (Para-
graph 8 of House Rules, Exhibit 19-P). 
3. During the ten years when Appellants oper-
ated the dining room, they had a complete salad bar with 
twenty or more different items, and four to eight entrees 
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every day for lunch and at least six to eight entrees and 
the salad bar in the evening. (R. 92). 
4. Appellants leased the Towne House Restaurant 
facilities to Nikols on or about December 1, 1971 (R. 242) 
for preparing and serving such food and beverages to club 
members as Appellants had previously supplied (R. 245). 
The lease provided that in the event there was not sufficient 
food and beverage business from Club members, Nikols was 
permitted to open the premises to the public. (R. 247-48). 
5. Paragraph 5 of the Sublease between Appellants 
and Respondent Nikols provided that Nikols would have 
available and prepare and serve to Club members food and 
beverages in the types and qualities being served by 
Appellants and at the following times: 
Lunch Monday through Friday 
11:30 a.m. to 2:30 a.m. 
Dinner Saturday 
7:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. 
Nikols was required to have sandwiches and drinks available 
Monday through Saturday from 6:00p.m. to 10:00 p.m. 
(R. 246). 
6. Nikols admitted that Appellants sought him 
because he was a master chef and because of his reputation 
as a good restauranteur (R. 180), and that he went into the 
Towne House to provide great and excellent quality of food 
and variety. (R. 181). * 
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7. Nikols did not change the format when he took 
over (R. 92) . He testified he had six or eight or more 
different entrees (R. 173, 174), and that he maintained the 
revolving salad bar, which had a great variety of salads, 
all during the period he ran the restaurant. (R. 180). 
8. Nikols opened the premises to the public in 
the spring of 1973 (R. 164), but tried to give the best 
menu items possible to bring in the customers. (R. 174). 
When Nikols opened to the public, he advertised the ex-
cellent cuisine. (R. 172). 
9. There was no cover charge while the rest-
aurant was private. (R. 167). After the restaurant was 
opened to the public, on most Fridays and Saturdays when 
Nikols had a local band, he did not charge a cover charge. 
(R. 178). Most of the time there was no cover charge on 
weeknights. (R. 175). 
10. On or about January 7, 1974, Nikols sub-
leased the restaurant to DAB (R. 254), who operate Aggie's 
Club and Restaurant on the premises. (R. 9). 
11. Nikols testified that Aggie was required to 
maintain excellent food and service. (R. 184). 
12. Nikols testified that Aggie worked as a 
manager, but did not have any knowledge as a restauranteur. 
(R. 183) . • •^•-••,. y. ........ ..;...:. 
13. In his operation, Aggie charges a $5.00 
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door charge or "package", (R. 17). The package includes 
the patrons' cover charge, floor show, dancing, all the 
patrons' beer, and all their drink mix. (R. 20, 220). 
14. Under Aggie's operation, on Wednesday 
evenings, the only food available was a roast beef dinner 
for $1.00 in addition to the $5.00 door charge. On Thursday 
evenings, only a spaghetti dinner was available for $1.00 
in addition to the $5.00 door charge. (R. 17-18, 222). 
15. Aggie discontinued the salad bar on July 
15, 1974. (R. 221). 
16. Aggie operates under a Class "C" Beer 
License, (Exhibit 12-P), and does not allow minors on the 
premises. (R. 33). Aggie also has a cabaret license. 
(R. 33) (Exhibit 10-P). 
17. For the period August 1, 1974 through 
November 12, 1974, Aggie's package sales exceeded total 
food sales by more than four times. Package sales exceeded 
dinner sales by eight times. On a number of Tuesday 
evenings when Aggie's was open, there were no dinner 
sales, but there were hundreds of dollars in package 
sales. (Exhibit 7-P). 
18. The figures shown for package sales in 
Exhibit 7-P do not include food, except for Wednesday and 
Thursday nights, when for an additional $1.00 a roast beef 
dinner or a spaghetti dinner was available. (R 20-21). 
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Aggie testified that on Wednesdays and Thursdays, a lot 
of his customers don't eat. (R. 17). 
19. Mr. Rinehart Peshell testified that on 
October 29, 1974 (a Tuesday evening) he arrived at Aggie's 
Club at approximately 10:30 p.m. (R. Ill), that he observed 
no one eating (R. 112), and that he only observed mixers 
being brought by girls and drinks brought in by patrons. 
(R. 112). Aggie's records show no dinner sales that 
evening. (Exhibit 7-P). -
20. Lorraine Heugly testified she visited 
Aggie's Club with her husband on October 29, 1974 (R. 138). 
They arrived at approximately a quarter to nine. There 
was no linen or silverware on the table. No one offered 
them a menu, and she did not observe anyone eating that 
evening. (R. 139) . Neither Mrs. Heugly nor her husband 
asked for a menu (R. 141-142). She didn't intend to eat 
when she went there. She didn't know it was a place to 
eat. She thought it was a club. (R. 142). 
21* Mrs. Heugly also attended Aggie's Club on 
October 31, 1974. She was not given a menu, she observed 
no one eating, and to her knowledge none of the tables were 
set up with silverware or napkins. She didn't expect there 
would be anything to eat. (R. 142) . 
22. Aggie testified he employed an entertainment 
group called "Promises"(R. 25, 37) who put on a floor show 
called "Rip Rock and the Stick Shifts", in which they used 
the words "ass", "shit", (R. 44, 45) and "horny" (R. 48) in Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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their act since August 1, 1974. 
23. Appellant testified that he had witnessed 
Aggie's floor show in August and that he had heard one of 
Aggie's entertainers state, "If I have offended anybody, 
fuck you." (R. 94-96). 
24. Mr. Peshell testified that he witnessed 
the floor show of Rip Rock and the Stick Shifts on the 
night of October 29, 1974. Two of the entertainers carried 
on a conversation concerning their sexual prowess, using 
some female patrons as an example, one claiming the other 
entertainer's organs were small and that he knew the lady's 
vagina was large because he had engaged in sex with her. 
There was a slide show in which one slide showed a lady 
with bared breasts. The group presented a further routine 
of two young men riding in a car, discussing their desire 
for intercourse, crabs, itching and their sexual organs. 
After drinking beer, one indicated he needed to relieve 
himself, and proceeded to act out urinating. (R. 113-115). 
25. On November 13, 1974, Mr. Peshell again 
visited Aggie's Club (R. 115). One of the entertainers 
acted as if he opened a can of beer using his sexual organ. 
The entertainers also acted out urinating on some of the 
patrons. (R. 118). Aggie was there on both occasions. 
(R. 119). 
26. Ken Rasmussen, a member of the Towne House 
Athletic Club, testified that his children used to visit 
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the restaurant first when Appellant and then when Nikols 
ran the restaurant, but they ceased when Aggie took over. 
(R. 106-107). He would no longer let them go because of 
the type of operation. (R. 107). 
27. David R. Davidson, Jr., a member of the 
Towne House, testified he had two minor daughters who 
patronized the restaurant prior to the time it became 
Aggie's when Appellants and Nikols operated it, and that 
they have not gone to it since it became Aggie's Club and 
Restaurant because a sign says "No Minors Allowed". (R. 108 
109). 
28. Aggie had charges of approximately $613.01 
from Towne House members. (R. 198-199). 
20. Aggie testified that Appellant never asked 
him to carry any charges for him (R. 198, 201) and that 
Appellants refused to back up charges by members so that 
Aggie's would extend them credit. (R. 211). 
30. Appellant's bookkeeper received Aggie's 
bill for charges and went over it with him. (R. 201). 
There was no evidence she agreed the bill was owed or 
had authority to so agree. 
31. Aggie testified he assumed Appellant would 
pay the charges when he sent him the statement. (R. 200). 
32. Paragraph 16 of the Sublease dated December 
1, 1971 between Appellants and Respondent Nikols, provides 
in part: ••-• -;™-..-. _ 
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Sublessor and Sublessee agree that if 
either defaults in any of the conditions 
and terms of this lease, the defaulting 
party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
including attorney fees, which may 
arise or accrue from enforcing this 
lease or in obtaining possession of the 
premises or in pursuing any remedy pro-
vided by the laws of the State of Utah 
whether by filing suit or otherwise. 
(R. 251). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHEN THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND 
THAT APPELLANTS HAD NOT BREACHED THE 
NIKOLS SUBLEASE, IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE 
COURT TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES TO 
RESPONDENTS. 
Nikols counterclaimed against Appellants for 
breach of the covenant of quiet possession in Paragraph 11 
of the Sublease between Appellants and Nikols, and claimed 
attorneys' fees. The court's award of attorneys' fees 
was clearly improper. The Sublease between Nikols and the 
Appellants provides that in the event of default, the 
defaulting party would pay attorneys' fees. There is no 
other provision for attorneys' fees. The court specifically 
determined that Nikols had no cause of action against 
Appellants. In spite of the fact that the court dismissed 
all counts of Nikols' claims as to alleged breach of the 
Sublease by Appellants (R. 348), the court awarded Nikols 
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I 
I 
attorneys' fees in the amount of $3,665.63. Because the I 
court dismissed Nikols' claims, there was no basis on 
which to award attorneys' fees. I 
The court again erred in awarding attorneys1 | 
fees to DAB, who had counterclaimed against Appellants 
for breach of the covenant of quiet possession contained I 
in the Sublease Agreement between DAB and Nikols, and 
sought general damages in the amount of $4,500. The 
court dismissed DAB's claim, no cause of action, (R. 348), 
but awarded DAB attorneys' fees in the amount of $3,175.00. 
Because the court dismissed DAB's counterclaim no attorneys' ] 
fees should have been awarded. Such award would be 
improper under both the Stevensen-Nikols Sublease and 
the Nikols-DAB Sublease Agreement. re ; i 
In addition, the award of attorneys' fees to 
DAB was improper for another reason. Paragraph 16 of the 
Sublease Agreement between Nikols and DAB, under which 
the court awarded attorneys' fees to DAB, is binding only 
upon Nikols and DAB. Appellants were not ever parties 
to that agreement. Respondent Nikols could not bind -v •,••".. 
Appellants to an agreement to pay attorneys' fees to his 
sublessees. 
e^ : This court has frequently stated that attorneys' 
fees are not recoverable unless provided for by the contract 
or authorized by statute. See Pacific Coast Title Insurance 
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Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.f 7 Ut. 2d 377, 
325 P.2d 906 (1958). In the instant case, we have neither. 
Because Nikols was not entitled to be awarded attorneys' 
fees under his Agreement with Appellants, and because DAB 
had no agreement with Appellants, the trial court was ab-
solutely wrong in awarding attorneys' fees to Respondents. 
POINT II 
WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS CONCLUSIVE THAT 
RESPONDENTS DAB HAD CHANGED THE OPER-
ATION OF THE RESTAURANT, THE TRIAL COURT 
SHOULD HAVE FOUND AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT RESPONDENTS HAD BREACHED THE LEASE. 
Under paragraph 4 of the Sublease with Appellants, 
Nikols assumed the operation of preparing and serving such 
food and beverages as Appellants had previously supplied 
to members of the Club in the main dining room and kitchen 
area. Nikols was required to have available and serve 
to Club members food and beverages in the types and 
qualities then served by Appellants and to serve lunch 
Monday through Friday, 11:30 a.m. to 2:30 p.m., dinner on 
Saturday from 7:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., and to have sand-
wiches and drinks available Monday through Saturday from 
6:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. Nikols could offer additional 
service if he so determined. In the event there was not 
sufficient business from Club members to make the business 
profitable, then under paragraph 9 of the Sublease, Nikols 
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was permitted to open the premises to the public and make 
it a public restaurant. (See Statement of Facts 4 and 
5). ,:;,:.^fe^ :;u;t..oA:-n?tc ^vt-'^^:- '. 
The evidence was clear and uncontradicted that 
during the ten years Appellants operated the dining room 
facilities at The Towne House Athletic Club, they had 
maintained a revolving salad bar with twenty entrees, 
plus a menu with four to eight entrees at lunch and six 
to eight entrees for dinner. Appellants sought out Nikols 
because of his reputation as a master chef and fine 
restauranteur. When Nikols subleased the restaurant from 
Appellants, he maintained the salad bar and offered six 
to eight or more entrees off the menu. Members took 
their minor children to the restaurant. A cover charge 
was imposed only on a few occasions while the restaurant 
was private. When Nikols opened the restaurant to the 
public, he advertised the excellent cuisine. He only 
charged a cover charge when there was expensive entertain-
ment. On weeknights he tried not to charge a cover charge, 
and on most weekends he did not. (See Statement of Facts 
3, 6 through 9, 26 and 27). ^ 
Aggie drastically changed the operation of the 
restaurant. He discontinued the salad bar. Hq obtained 
a Class "C" Beer License and thereafter prohibited minors 
from using the restaurant facilities. He instituted a 
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package deal of $5.00 per person, which covered entrance, 
entertainment and all of each patron's beer and drink mix. 
His business records show that the great bulk of his 
income came from his package and not from food sales. 
For the period of August 1, 1974 through November 12, 1974, 
package sales exceeded total food sales by over four 
times. For that period, package sales exceeded the evening 
dinner sales by eight times. In fact, Aggie's business 
records show that on a number of evenings, there were no 
food sales at all. Witnesses testified that on the night 
of Tuesday, October 29, 1974, they observed no one eating, 
no tables were set up, and they were not offered menus. 
One witness testified she did not know she could get food 
there because she thought it was a club. Further, Aggie 
brought in a group of entertainers whose show included 
reference to sexual intercourse, sex organs, urination 
and similar material. (See Statement of Facts 13 through 25). 
These facts clearly establish that Aggie's 
operation differed substantially from the way in which 
Appellants and Respondent Nikols operated the restaurant. 
Aggie's operation resembles a bar rather than a restau-
rant. 
Appellants could find no Utah cases where a court 
has construed the meaning of "public restaurant". Most 
cases from other jurisdictions involving a judicial inter-
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pretation of this term have concerned liquor control, 
zoning or civil rights statutes. 
Aggiefs operation was not open to the public. 
Aggie's obtained a Class "C" Beer License. Section 
19-3-9 of the Salt Lake City Ordinances provides: 
Unlawful to Permit Minors in Certain 
Establishments. It shall be unlawful 
for any licensee of a Class "C", or 
Class "D", license for the sale of beerf 
or any operator, agent or employee of 
such licensee to permit any person 
under the age of twenty-one years to 
remain in or about such licensed premises. 
It is significant that Aggie's chose to obtain and operate 
under a Class "C" permit. The traditional restaurant 
beer license, a Class "B" permit, requires that sixty 
percent (60%) of the restaurant's revenue be derived from 
the sale of food. (Section 19-1-11, Salt Lake City 
Ordinances). As can be seen from Exhibit 7-P, Aggie's 
Club could not meet this requirement. By obtaining the 
Class "C" permit, Aggie excluded all minors as well as all 
minor members of The Towne House Club who formerly had 
full rights to use the facilities. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "public" as being 
"open to all". Where Aggie's operation denied admission 
to a significant portion of the public, all minor members 
of the Athletic Club, and all minor children of members, 
the Court should have found as a matter of law that Aggie 
i 
i 
i 
i 
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was not operating a public restaurant within the terms of 
the Sublease. 
Moreover, Aggie's Club does not meet any def-
inition of restaurant used by Salt Lake City. Section 
51-2-42A (1972) of the Salt Lake City Zoning Ordinance 
provides: 
< RESTAURANT. "Restaurant" shall mean 
a building within which there is served 
a variety of hot food for consumption 
on the premises and where more than 
sixty (60%) percent of the gross volume 
is derived from the sale of foods 
served for consumption on the premises. 
For purposes of obtaining a Class "B" Beer License, Section 
19-1-11 (1974) of the Salt Lake City Ordinances states 
"restaurant" 
-;'.£• /"-'" . . . shall mean premises where a 
variety of hot food is served for con-
sumption on the premises and where 
more than sixty percent of the gross 
volume of business is derived from the 
sale of food served for consumption 
on the premises. 
A very high percentage of Aggie's revenue comes 
from his package sales, which includes the cover charge, 
beer and mixers. Less than one-fourth of Aggie's total 
revenue comes from food sales. Clearly Aggie's does not 
meet the sixty percent requirement of the ordinances. In 
addition, both ordinances require that a variety of hot 
food be served. Aggie's own testimony was that on Wednesdays 
and Thursdays only one item was available. 
The business license definition of restaurant is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
broad. Section 20-14-1 (1971) of the Salt Lake City 
Ordinances states: 
"Restaurant" as used in this chapter 
shall be defined to be any place 
where food or drink is prepared, 
served or offered for sale or sold 
for human consumption on or off the 
premises. 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
j 
i 
i 
The obvious intent of the city is to regulate all businesses, 
and, therefore, the definition of restaurant must necessarily 
be broad enough to cover all establishments where any food 
at all is served. It is therefore more appropriate to I 
refer to other ordinances, such as zoning and liquor con-
trol, as well as cases, to determine the ordinary definition 
of a restaurant. 
In Leograndis v. Liquor Control Commission, 
149 Conn. 507, 182 A.2d 9 (Sup. Ct. Err. 1962), the | 
liquor control commission had suspended a restaurant 
liquor permit, and the lower court had dismissed an appeal 
from the suspension. The plaintiff had liquor sales for 
undisclosed periods of $47,989.45 as against food sales 
of $2,074.65. The plaintiff admitted he did little or 
no noon hour business and very little, if any, supper 
business. Most of his business was done on Friday and 
Saturday nights, when he provided a band and floor show. 
The defendant relied on Section 30-1(17) of the general 
statutes, which defined restaurant as follows: 
i 
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(17) "Restaurant" means space, in a 
suitable and permanent building, kept, 
used, maintained, advertised and held 
out to the public to be a place where hot 
meals are regularly served, . . . 
The court, in construing this statute stated: 
The mere possession of a supply of food 
sufficient to offer a limited number and 
variety of meals would not make the 
premises a restaurant under Section 30-1(17) 
if there were so few food patrons or 
their demands for food were so insign-
ificant that the service of hot meals 
was not a regular part of the permitee's 
business. 182 A.2d at 11. 
The court concluded that the commission had 
committed no error in arriving at its decision. 
Fulford v. Board of Zoning Adjustment of City of 
Dothan, 256 Ala. 336, 54 A.2d 580 (1951) arose from a pro-
ceeding before the Board of Zoning Adjustment for permission 
to sell beer in a restaurant. The Board denied permission, 
and the petitioners appealed to the circuit court, which 
affirmed the Board's action. The Supreme Court of Alabama 
held that the sale of beer in the restaurant would have 
been an unauthorized extension of the nonconforming business 
under the zoning ordinances. In its analysis, the court 
cited with approval the following language: 
"A restaurant is defined by Webster to 
be an eating house and such it has always 
been construed under the law and not 
where intoxicants are dispensed under the 
guise of running a restaurant, a restaurant 
keeper in contemplation of law is not a 
saloon keeper" . . . "A restaurant does 
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not necessarily mean a beer and wine 
restaurant^ and a written lease of 
premises for use as a restaurant did 
not obligate landlord to assent to 
application for a beer and wine license." 
(citations omitted)* 
Appellant's evidence as to the operation of 
Aggie's Club was clear and unrebutted. Aggie's is not 
operated as a public restaurant, as such term has been 
defined by Salt Lake City and has been construed by 
the Courts. The bulk of Aggie's revenue comes from 
his package sales. Food constitutes a small part of 
his total business. 
In addition, if there was any doubt as to 
what the term "public restaurant" means, the court 
should have considered the construction placed upon 
the term by the parties themselves. When Appellants 
operated the restaurant, they provided a variety of 
entrees and the salad bar to members. Nikols entered 
in to provide excellent food and service to Athletic 
Club members, and he continued this operation when he 
opened to the public. That is the best evidence of 
what the parties contemplated when they used the term 
"public restaurant". Aggie's operation differs sub-
stantially from prior operation by Appellants and Nikols. 
Under the Sublease, Nikols was permitted to 
offer additional service, but he was not permitted to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-19-
either change the operation or curtail it. The evidence 
was clear as to Aggie's operation. Respondents pre-
sented no contradictory evidence except their own self-
serving statements, which were contradicted by Aggie's own 
business records. 
Aggie's operation clearly fails to meet the 
standards of a restaurant for liquor and zoning purposes, 
and it does not meet the criteria established by other 
courts which have construed similar liquor and zoning 
laws. The trial court should have found as a matter of 
law that Respondents were not operating the premises as 
a public restaurant. 
POINT III 
v THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING $613.01 
TO RESPONDENTS FOR CHARGES MADE BY 
— MEMBERS OF THE SALT LAKE ATHLETIC CLUB. 
The evidence was clear that there was no agree-
ment for Appellants to pay DAB for charges made by members 
of the Athletic Club at Aggie's Club & Restaurant. 
Aggie testified that Appellants never asked him to carry 
any charges for him. Aggie later testified that Appellants 
refused to back up the charges by Athletic Club members 
so that Aggie would extend them credit. Aggie sent a 
statement to Appellants for charges by Athletic Club members. 
Appellant's bookkeeper acknowledged receipt of Aggie's bill 
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CONCLUSION 
I 
I and went over it with him, but there is no evidence that she agreed the bill was owed or that she had authority 
to so agree. (See Statement of Facts 28 through 31). I 
There was no evidence that Appellants and DAB 
ever reached any understanding or agreement concerning 
payment or guaranty of the charges. On the contrary, 
Aggie testified Appellants refused to guaranty charges 
by members. Moreover, under no principle of contract 
law could appellants be bound by an agreement or arrange-
ment between Aggie and persons who are also members of 
the Salt Lake Athletic Club. The trial court erred in 
awarding the amount of such charges to DAB. 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
Appellants respectfully request this court to 
reverse the trial court's decision with regard to 
Appellants' complaint and to award judgment to Appellants, 
terminating Respondents' possession of the premises, to I 
reverse the trial court's award of attorneys' fees to 
Respondent Nikols and Respondents DAB, and to reverse the I 
trial court's award of $613.01 to Respondents DAB under i 
Count IV of their counterclaim. Appellants also request 
that this court assess damages against all Respondents for 
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their unlawful detainer of the premises from and after 
September 12, 1974, at the rate of $3,000 per month. 
(R. 294). 
DATED this 2^> day of June, 1975. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES A. ARROWSMITH 
WATKINS & FABER 
606 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-
: Appellants 
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Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorney for Defendant-Respondent • 
^ A I 
DAB Associates, postage prepaid, this J^* day of " 
June, 1975. 
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Respondent Nikols, and two copies to F. Alan Fletcher, 
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